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Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, and Jus Cogens
Anthony J. Colangelo*
Abstract
Immunities in international law expose multifaceted tensions between goals ofinternational stability and legal accountability. This Article seeks to clarif the law in this area
by providing conceptual and doctrinal coherence to relationships between immunity andjurisdiction. It first explains that foreign sovereign immunity and ofidal status-based immunity
are jurisdictional in that they block the exercse of adjudicative jurisdiction by foreign states'
courts. The Article then explains that these immunities do not block the prescriptive
jurisdiction offoreign states' laws to regulate conduct, even conduct inside other states, fa basis
ofprescriptivejurisdiction exists in international aw.
The Article agues that this view of the relationshps between immunity and jurisdiction
makes sense on, and holds two important consequences for, the current state of the law. First,
the relevant law-in-time for gauging these immunities is the law in existence when a court
determines whether to entertain suit, not the law in existence at the time of the conduct
underlying the suit. As a result, the viability of claims arising out of the same underlying facts
changes along with changes in the law of immunity. Second, this view gives the immunity
doctrines rule-of-law coherence by avoiding legality problems or retroactive application of the law
any time a post-conduct trigger like a waiver or change in status removes immunity.
Last, the Article assesses the law of conduct-based immunity and, in particular,
arguments that conduct-based immunity does not attach for violations of jus cogens, or
peremptor. norms of international law. Compared with the relativey settled laws of foreign
sovereign and status-based immunities, the law of conduct-based immunity is influx. Because
customary international law arises from state practice and opinio juris, arguments used to
avoid direct collisions between other types of immunity and jus cogens do not necessarily
extend by analogy to conduct-based immunity, which is its own distinct doctrine under
international law. Most prominenty, arguments that foreign sovereign and status-based
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immunities do not come into direct conflict with, and thus do not yield to, jus cogens-
because those immunities address amenability to suit while jus cogens address substantive
prohibitions under international law--may not apply when the immunity at issue is conduct-
based. For instance, conduct-based immuniy may be understood as a substantive, as opposed to
a jurisdictional, defense on the current state of the law, especialy in criminal suits. In which
case, conduct-based immunity does come into direct conflict with, and yields to, jus cogens.
The Article concludes that the present state offlux in the law of conduct-based immunity may
also be indicative of immuniy norms bending to accountability norms where the law is
unsettled.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The international law of immunity exposes complex conceptual and
doctrinal tensions between the sometimes competing goals of international
stability and legal accountability. From a real-world litigation standpoint, the
nature and scope of immunities under international law have become
increasingly contested and central elements in suits around the world.' In
particular, the push to hold perpetrators of serious violations of international law
criminally and civilly accountable in domestic courts has accelerated the need for
a clean understanding of both current immunity doctrines and their potential
development going forward.
Courts and commentators often describe immunities as "jurisdictional. 2
This Article seeks to clarify relationships between doctrines of immunity and
jurisdiction and to chart implications of its argument for less settled areas of the
law. It begins by introducing different types of immunity and jurisdiction in
international law. Immunity can be divided into three main types: foreign
sovereign immunity, which immunizes foreign states as states; official status-
based immunity, which immunizes certain high-ranking officials of foreign
states; and official conduct-based immunity, which immunizes certain official
conduct performed on behalf of foreign states.3 Jurisdiction can also be divided
into three main types: adjudicative jurisdiction, which is the power to subject
persons or things to judicial process; prescriptive jurisdiction, which is the power
to regulate the conduct of persons or things; and enforcement jurisdiction,
which is the power to enforce law as to persons or things.4
The Article next explains that foreign sovereign immunity and official
status-based immunity are jurisdictional in the sense that they block the exercise
of adjudicative jurisdiction by other states-that is, the exercise of jurisdiction by
other states' courts. But the Article argues that foreign sovereign and official
status-based immunities do not block the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction by
other states-that is, the jurisdiction of other states to regulate conduct or
activity underlying a suit, even where that conduct or activity occurs inside the
territory of another state.
Two important consequences follow from this jurisdictional understanding.
First, the relevant conduct or event to which these immunities apply is not the
conduct underlying or giving rise to suit, but rather a court's exercise of
I Hazel Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunit 2-8 (Oxford 2d ed 2008).
2 See, for example, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000 (Congo v Bel 2002 ICJ 3, 25 at
60 (Feb 3, 2002). See also Fox, The Law of State ImMunio at 1 (cited in note 1).
3 See Section II.
4 See Section III.
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jurisdiction to entertain that suit. As a result, the applicable law-in-time to gauge
immunity claims is the law in existence at the time the court decides whether to
entertain suit, not the law in existence at the time of the conduct underlying the
suit. This is important because, like all international law, the law of foreign
sovereign and official status-based immunities is fluid; it can and has changed
over time-indeed, in some respects rather dramatically in recent history'-and
it is likely to continue to change. Thus, as the Article illustrates, claims that may
not have succeeded in the past because they would have run into an immunity
blockade may now move forward on the same underlying facts, and vice versa.6
The second important consequence of this jurisdictional view is that it
reconciles these immunities with legality principles central to the rule of law. In
particular, situations in which foreign sovereign and official status-based
immunities previously would have blocked proceedings that later may go
forward due to a post-conduct rescission of immunity-for example, a waiver of
immunity or a lapse in official status-present no retroactivity or legality
problems. As long as a basis of prescriptive jurisdiction existed at the time of the
conduct underlying the suit, the substantive law sought to be applied in the later
proceedings governed the conduct when and where it occurred. In this way,
viewing the immunity as an adjudicative jurisdiction doctrine gives it rule-of-law
coherence.
To put the point conversely, imagine that foreign sovereign and official
status-based immunities were viewed (incorrectly) as affecting prescriptive
jurisdiction. The immunities would then block the jurisdiction of foreign states
to regulate conduct underlying specific claims instead of merely blocking the
jurisdiction of foreign states' courts to entertain those claims. Accordingly, any
time a post-conduct trigger like a lapse in status or a waiver were to rescind
immunity, any proceedings dependent on that post-conduct trigger would entail
retroactive application of the law, since the law being applied did not, as a matter
of prescriptive jurisdiction, govern the conduct when and where it occurred.
And because both international and US law have long contemplated post-
conduct rescissions of immunity,7 the result would be a retroactive application of
the law, defeating widely held and longstanding principles of legality.
See Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet's Legay Reassessed, 106 Am J Intl L 731, 738 (2012) (explaining that
"the customary international law of state immunity has undergone profound change over the last
hundred years, most significantly in the move from absolute to restrictive immunity"). See also
Rosanne van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and
International Human Rights Law 1-9 (Oxford 2008).
6 See Section V.A.
7 Republc ofAustria vAltmann, 541 US 677, 711 (2004), citing Verlinden B.IV. v Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 US 480, 486 (1983); Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, 98 Am J Intl L 407, 425 (2004).
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Last, the Article addresses official conduct-based immunity. It begins by
canvassing the law and explaining that, unlike the relatively well-settled laws of
foreign sovereign and status-based immunities, the law of conduct-based
immunity is in flux. It then argues that if conduct-based immunity is deemed a
substantive as opposed to a jurisdictional defense, it comes into more direct
conflict with jus cogens norms of international law. As a result, prevailing
arguments for preserving immunity in the face of claims ofjus cogens violations
lose force when it comes to conduct-based immunity. The reason is the
immunity is a substantive defense from liability, not a jurisdictional defense
about the appropriate forum. It thus comes into more direct conflict with, and
accordingly must yield to, jus cogens. The Article finds that present international
law would be most receptive to this type of argument in criminal as opposed to
civil cases. And it concludes that the uncertain nature of the law of conduct-
based immunity may signal movement in international law away from immunity
and toward accountability. Accountability norms have been pressing on
immunities for some time now. Foreign sovereign and official status-based
immunities have so far successfully resisted that pressure; the fractured law of
conduct-based immunity may not.
II. VARIOUS IMMUNITIES
Immunities come in various forms in both US and international law. One
form immunizes from suit in domestic courts foreign sovereigns qua
sovereigns.' This form of immunity is, unsurprisingly, called foreign sovereign
immunity, though it is also referred to as foreign state immunity outside the
United States. Thus foreign sovereign immunity immunizes Italy-the sovereign
state-from suit in US courts. In the United States this form of immunity is
presently governed by statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA).9
Another form of immunity immunizes from suit particular high-ranking
officials of foreign states, such as heads of state and foreign ministers. 1" As
might be expected, this form of immunity is generally called foreign official
immunity or, where applicable, head-of-state immunity.1 Thus foreign official or
head-of-state immunity immunizes the Italian head of state from suit in US
courts.
8 Fox, 1he Law of State Immunioy at 1 (cited in note 1).
9 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified as amended
in various sections of 28 USC.
10 See Samantar v Yousuf, 130 S Ct 2278, 2291 (2010).
11 Id at 2290 n 15.
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A further distinction exists between immunity that attaches because of a
particular status, such as being head of state or foreign minister, and immunity
that attaches because of the nature of the particular conduct underlying a claim,
such as conduct performed as part of the actor's official duties. Readers might
guess by now that these immunities are referred to, respectively, as status-based
immunity and conduct-based immunity.12 In international law speak, status-
based immunity is called immunity ratione personae, and conduct-based immunity
is called immunity ratione materiae."3 Because the sources often use the Latin and
English terms interchangeably, I will too by referring to status-based immunity
or immunity ratione personae on the one hand, and conduct-based immunity or
immunity ralione materiae on the other.
Status-based immunity or immunity ratione personae is basically an absolute
protection for certain high-ranking officials like heads of state and ministers of
foreign affairs against all proceedings in other states' courts.14 That is, it blocks
all foreign proceedings against these officials, irrespective of whether the
proceedings relate to the officials' public or private acts or whether the acts
occurred during or before the officials' tenure in office.15 However, because the
immunity attaches only to the officials' status as an office holder, once tenure in
office ceases so too does the status-based immunity.
16
At this point, the only immunity potentially available to former officials is
conduct-based immunity, or immunity ratione materiae. This form of immunity is
both broader and narrower than status-based immunity or immunity ratione
personae. It is broader because it arguably extends to anyone acting on behalf of
the state, not just high-level officials, and it also continues to protect former
officials after they have left office; but it is narrower because, as its name
suggests, it applies only in respect of official conduct. 17 A key question right now
in both US and international law is whether this conduct-based immunity ratione
materiae attaches in respect of conduct that constitutes serious violations of
12 Chim~ne I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immuniy and the "Baseline" Problem, 80 Fordham L Rev 605, 605
(2011).
13 Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in US Courts: The Case against the State
Department, 51 VaJ Intl L 915, 929 (2011).
14 See Akande, 98 Am J Intl L at 410 (cited in note 7).
15 Id; Yousurfv Samantar, 699 F3d 763, 769 (4th Cir 2012). But see Wuerth, 106 Am J Ind L at 740-41
(cited in note 5) (explaining that "[h]istorically, ratione personae immunity has been close to
absolute. Today, the issue is somewhat more complicated because some states view status
immunity as a function of state immunity itself; accordingly, heads of state (like states themselves)
are perhaps not entitled to immunity from civil proceedings for certain private acts.").
16 Akande, 98 Am J Intl L at 410 (cited in note 7).
17 Id at 412-13; Chimbne I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 Yale J
Intl L Online *1, *9 (2010).
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international law and, more specifically, violations of what are called jus cogens, or
peremptory norms of international law-including prohibitions on grave human
rights abuses like torture and genocide.18 I return to this question in the last
section of the Article.
III. IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTION
Like immunity, the term "jurisdiction" encompasses a multitude of legal
doctrines in both US and international law. A good way to begin exploring the
relationship between jurisdiction and immunity is by sorting out some of these
jurisdictional doctrines. And a good place to start doing that is with the initial
observation that the international legal doctrine traditionally most at odds with
the notion of immunities for foreign sovereigns and their officials is, in fact, a
doctrine of jurisdiction. Specifically, classical international law granted all states
absolute power within their own territorial jurisdictions. To borrow US Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall's famous formulation of the law in 1812:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty... 19
If a state's jurisdiction within its own territory is exclusive and absolute,
then any rule restricting the exercise of that jurisdiction-such as a rule
according immunity to foreign sovereigns or their agents-"would imply a
diminution of [the forum state's] sovereignty" by undermining its exclusive and
absolute territorial jurisdiction. In other words, foreign sovereign and official
status immunities are in fundamental tension with a state's exclusive and
absolute territorial jurisdiction, also commonly referred to as its "sovereignty,"
because the immunities purport to limit what a state may do within its own
territory.
Of course, as the name suggests, the doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity also purports to anchor itself in sovereignty: namely, the sovereignty
of other coequal states in the international system. An enduring rationale for the
doctrine draws from the Latin maxim par in parem non habet imperium, or "one
sovereign State is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State."2 Hence the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity simultaneously subverts and supports
sovereignty. It subverts the sovereignty of the forum state that otherwise could
18 See Yousuf, 699 F3d at 775-78; Wuerth, 106 AmJ Intl L at 732 (cited in note 5); Curtis A. Bradley
and Laurence R. Heifer, Internadonal Law and the US Common law of Foreign Official Immuni, 2010
Sup Ct Rev 213, 237-38 (2010).
19 The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US 116, 136 (1812).
20 Fox, The Law of State Immunit at 57 (cited in note 1).
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exercise jurisdiction, and it supports the sovereignty of the foreign state that
otherwise could be subject to that jurisdiction.
Others have explored different ways of conceptualizing the doctrine's
source in international law-in particular, whether it is an exception voluntarily
carved out of the forum state's otherwise exercisable jurisdiction, or instead
consists of some grant of right to the foreign state against proceedings in the
forum state-as well as the implications of those differing conceptualizations.21
This quandary about the doctrine's root stretches back in one form or another at
least to Marshall's opinion in the Schooner Exchange v McFaddon quoted above.22
There, the Chief Justice took the exception view, explaining that "all exemptions
from territorial jurisdiction, must be derived from the consent of the sovereign
of the territory" 23-consent that could be either express or, more usually,
implied, since in Marshall's lyrical prose, "all sovereigns impliedly engage not to
avail themselves of a power over their equal, which a romantic confidence in
their magnanimity has placed in their hands.,
24
It is not my objective to intervene in longstanding discussions about where
the international law of foreign sovereign immunity and related doctrines of
official status- and conduct-based immunity come from, or even really to
critique current doctrine. Rather, I intend to take the settled law more or less as I
find it. What I do want to do, however, is give that law doctrinal coherence for
courts and lawyers increasingly confronting these immunity issues. My aim will
be not only to explain how the law works but also how it can work going
forward in areas that remain somewhat less settled. With this goal in mind, it will
be helpful now to delve deeper into jurisdictional doctrine in order to discern
precisely which types of jurisdiction these various immunities interact with.
IV. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN AND STATUS-BASED IMMUNITIES
As noted, foreign sovereign immunity and status-based immunity are often
referred to as "jurisdictional immunities." 2 Thus the recent case in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which Germany claimed that Italy failed to
21 See Lee M. Caplan, State Immuniy, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative
Hierarchy Theog, 97 Am J Intl L 741, 746-57 (2003); Fox, The Law of State Immunity at 74-77 (cited
in note 1); Keitner, 80 Fordham L Rev at 606-08 (cited in note 12).
22 See note 19. See also Verlinden B. V. v CentralBank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 487-88 (1983); Monroe
Leigh, Sovereign Immunity-The Case of the 'Imias" 68 Am J Intl L 280 (1974); Christian Tomuschat,
The International Law of State Immuniy and Its Development by National Institutions, 44 Vand J Transnatl
L 1105, 1117 (2011).
23 The Schooner Exchange, 11 US at 143.
24 Id at 138.
25 See, for example, notes 26-27.
Vol. 14 No. 1
Jurisdiction, Immunity, legality
respect Germany's sovereign immunity under international law was officially
styled the "Jurisdictional Immunities of the State" case.26 Similarly, when the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Congo) challenged Belgium's issuance
of an arrest warrant against the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs in the ICJ
on status-based immunity grounds, the ICJ repeatedly referred to the immunity
at issue as "jurisdictional immunity. '2 But in what way are these immunities
"jurisdictional"? To be sure, they purport to preclude one state from exercising
jurisdiction over another state and its officials, but what type of jurisdiction are
we talking about?
A state's "jurisdiction' 28 is not monolithic under international law. Rather,
it comprises three main aspects, often referred to as jurisdiction to prescribe,
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce.29 Jurisdiction to prescribe,
or prescriptive jurisdiction, is the power to make and apply law to persons or
things. 30 Jurisdiction to adjudicate, or adjudicative jurisdiction, is the power to
subject persons or things to adjudicative or judicial process.31 And jurisdiction to
enforce, or enforcement jurisdiction, is the power to enforce law as to persons
or things.
32
In this Section, I explain that when courts describe foreign sovereign
immunity and status-based immunity as jurisdictional, these immunities are
jurisdictional only in the sense that they block adjudicative or judicial
jurisdiction.33 That is, foreign sovereign and status-based immunities bar only the
exercise of jurisdiction by foreign courts. Equally significant, and in tandem with
describing foreign sovereign and status-based immunities as bars to adjudicative
jurisdiction, courts also tend to emphasize that, "immunity does not mean
26 JurisdictionalImmunities of/heState (Ger v Ila), 2012 ICJ 1 (Feb 3, 2012).
27 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v Beg), 2002 ICJ 3, 24-25 at 59-60
(Feb 3, 2002).
28 The word "jurisdiction" is basically a legal term for power, literally the power to "speak law." The
term derives from the Latinjus orjuris (law) plus dicere (speak). William R. Trumbull and Angus
Stevenson, eds, Shorter Oxford Ditionay on Historical Priniples 1472 (Oxford 5th ed 2002). It literally
means "the speaking of law." Costas Douzinas, The Metaphysics of Jurisdiction, in Shaun McVeigh,
ed, Jurisprndence ofJurisdiction 21, 22 (Roudedge-Cavendish 2007).
29 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 401 (1987).
30 Id 401(a).
31 Id 401 (b).-
32 Id 401(c) and introductory note.
33 See, for example, Fox, The Law of State Immuniy at 1 (cited in note 1) ("Immunity is a plea relating
to the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction of national courts which bars the municipal court
of one State from adjudicating the disputes of another State.").
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impunity. '" This frequently heard qualification is not some trite bromide
repeated to make everyone feel better about immunizing from domestic justice
systems what might look like very bad behavior by foreign actors. Rather, it is
intended to convey that the immunity does not remove liability under the
governing substantive law; it merely prevents certain judicial bodies from
entertaining suit in certain circumstances.
I want to argue that this latter point-that foreign sovereign and status-
based immunities do not remove liability under the governing substantive law-
highlights another key relationship between these immunities and jurisdiction:
namely, their relationship with prescriptive jurisdiction. In short, while these
immunities may block the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by foreign courts,
they do not block the reach and application of foreign law to the underlying
conduct at issue if a foreign state has a basis of prescriptive jurisdiction to
regulate the conduct under international law.
States currently enjoy a number of bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under
international law, including over conduct inside other states. For instance, states
may regulate not only acts that occur within their own territories, but also acts
abroad that have, or are intended to have, effects within their territories---or
what is called objective territoriality jurisdiction.3" States may also regulate acts
by their nationals abroad-or "active personality jurisdiction"-as well as acts
against their nationals in some circumstances--or "passive personality
jurisdiction."36 In addition, states may regulate acts abroad that threaten "the
security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental
functions," like espionage or counterfeiting the state's currency3---or what is
often referred to as the protective principle of jurisdiction. 3 Finally, the principle
of universal jurisdiction authorizes all states to apply substantive international
law to certain especially harmful offenses, including piracy, slavery, genocide,
torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and some acts of terrorism.39
Indeed, to the extent states accurately implement and apply the international
34 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 ICJ at 25, 60; United Nations, Press Release, Legal
Committee is Told Immunioy of High Officials in Foreign Jurisdiction Must Not Mean Impunity for Commission
of Grave Crimes: Concern over 'Balance' Needed to Preserve Stabili v in International Relations,
UN Doc GA/L/3426 (Nov 1, 2011), online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/
ga13426.doc.htm (visited Feb 28,2013). See also S~vrine Knuchel, State Immuniy and the Promise of
Jus Cogens, 9 NwJ Intl Hum Rts 149, 181-82 (2011).
35 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(1)(c) (1987).
36 Id 5 402(2), comment g.
37 Id § 402(3), comment f.
38 Id.
39 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 Va J Intl L 149, 186-98
(2006) (appendix detailing current universal jurisdiction offenses under international law).
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substantive law proscribing these offenses in domestic law and proceedings,
states do not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction by projecting solely domestic
law abroad to defendants, but instead act as decentralized enforcers of a
universally applicable international law prohibiting the conduct everywhere."
To give the dynamic between doctrines of foreign sovereign and status-
based immunities and doctrines of prescriptive jurisdiction more concrete
illustration, suppose a high-ranking State B official engages in activity in State A
that violates State A's laws. On the view presented so far, State A's laws regulate
that activity and impose liability when and where the act occurs. Status-based
immunity or immunity ratione personae may block the exercise of jurisdiction by
State A's courts to apply that conduct-regulating rule through State A's domestic
judicial proceedings, but liability under the law still exists in the abstract. The
same is true if the conduct at issue violates international law. Liability under
international law exists, but the status-based immunity may bar other states'
courts from applying that law to the defendant. And if the conduct constitutes a
universal jurisdiction offense, every state in the world has prescriptive
jurisdiction to regulate that activity under international law." Again, the status-
based immunity blocks only the jurisdiction of foreign courts to adjudicate; but
substantive liability under international law exists always and everywhere.
The cases bear this out. For example, in the Congo versus Belgium Arrest
Warrant case, the Congo objected to Belgium's claim of universal jurisdiction
over the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs on grounds of status-based
immunity. The Congo stressed, however, that "immunity does not mean
impunity." 42 Indeed the Congo accepted that immunity based on official status
did not exempt violators of international law from liability. 43 Rather, immunity
attached only to bar proceedings before certain courts and for a certain period of
time.' What comes through in the Congo's position before the Court is that
immunity is procedural in the sense that it is immunity from proceedings and, more
40 AnthonyJ. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International 'False Conflict" of Laws, 30 Mich J Intl L
881, 883 (2009) (arguing that "the prescriptive reach of universal jurisdiction is not really
extraterritorial at all; but rather comprises a comprehensive territorial jurisdiction, originating in a
universally applicable international law that covers the globe").
41 There is a symbiosis in this respect between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction when it
comes to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Because it is the definition of the offense under
international law that gives rise to jurisdiction in the first place, states must employ that
international legal definition when they exercise universal jurisdiction. In this respect, the
applicable law-whether it is incorporated into a domestic rule of decision or just applied directly
by courts-is substantive international law. See id at 901-16.
42 Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000, 2002 ICJ at 20, 48 (cited in note 27).
43 Id.
44 Id.
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specifically, from judicial proceedings, not from a substantive, conduct-
regulating rule. Thus, cast in the context of the Arrest Warrant case, the status-
based immunity did not interdict Belgian law prohibiting universal jurisdiction
offenses from regulating activity by foreigners abroad. It was just that Belgian
courts could not subject the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs to judicial
process or adjudicative jurisdiction.
The ICJ adopted this position in the case, explaining in now familiar terms
that, "immuniy from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign
Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they
might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. ' 45
The Court elaborated: "While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature,
criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity
may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offenses; it cannot
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility."46 A
47
number of separate opinions in the case also take this view.
The same goes for foreign sovereign immunity. In the Germany versus
Italy Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, the ICJ considered there to be "no
doubt" that the activities Italy alleged Germany had perpetrated during World
War II constituted serious violations of the international law of armed conflict
applicable in 1943-45.48 Yet the Court went on to explain that it was "not called
upon to decide whether these acts were illegal," which nobody disputed, but
rather was called upon only to decide "whether or not, in proceedings regarding
claims for compensation arising out of those acts, the Italian courts were obliged
to accord Germany immunity., 49 Hence, when the ICJ observed that "immunity
45 Id at 25, 1 60.
46 Arrest Warrant of 11 Apri1 2000, 2002 1CJ at 25, 60 (cited in note 27).
47 See, for example, id at 60, 5 (Koroma, separate opinion):
Jurisdiction relates to the power of a State to affect the rights of a person or
persons by legislative, executive or judicial means, whereas immunity
represents the independence and exemption from the jurisdiction or
competence of the courts and tribunals of a foreign State and is an essential
characteristic of a State ... It is not, however, that immunity represents
freedom from legal liability as such, but rather that it represents an exemption
from legal process.
Id at 85, 74 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal)
('[Tmmunity is never substantive and thus cannot exculpate the offender from personal criminal
responsibility. It has also given rise to a tendency, in the case of international crimes, to grant
procedural immunity from jurisdiction only for as long as the suspected State official is in
office.").
48 Jurisdictional Immunities ofthe State, 2012 ICJ at 22, 52 (cited in note 26).
49 Id at 23, 53. See also Fox, The Law of State Immuniy at 33 (cited in note 1) ("The plea is one of
immunity from suit, not of exemption from law.').
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is essentially procedural in nature," and that "[iut regulates the exercise of
jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct and is thus entirely distinct from the
substantive law which determines whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful,"'
the Court again confirmed that immunity is procedural in the sense that it
immunizes defendants from proceedings-specifically, from judicial proceedings.
The substantive conduct-regulating rule of international law always proscribes
the activity as illegal.
A final point in support of categorizing foreign sovereign immunity as
jurisdictional is the manner in which the claim is typically raised in proceedings.
It resembles an objection to what US lawyers might think of as personal
jurisdiction. Although there is naturally variation across different nations' justice
systems, the claim is generally raised early in proceedings as an objection to the
power of the court to entertain suit and, more specifically, to entertain suit as to
the particular defendant."' And like personal jurisdiction, the objection may be
waived. (Though as will be discussed, where the defendant is a human being the
authority to waive rests with the defendant's home state, as opposed to the
defendant herself.5 ') In fact, the claim may be even stronger than a personal
jurisdiction objection in US federal courts since it is immediately appealable. As
Carlos Vazquez has noted with respect to the US Supreme Court's consideration
of whether the FSIA confers jurisdictional or substantive immunity: "The Court
need only have considered why the defendants were permitted to appeal against
the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity
grounds" to conclude that the immunity was jurisdictional.53 Because the
interlocutory appeal is designed to "protect the defendant not merely from
substantive liability but also from the burdens of litigation ... [t]he decision to
allow the appeal was thus itself a reflection of the immunity's status as a present
protection from the burdens of suit."' Accordingly, properly conceptualized,
foreign sovereign and status-based immunities are jurisdictional only in the sense
that they block the exercise of jurisdiction by courts; they do not block
prescriptive jurisdiction to make and apply substantive law to defendants'
conduct.
50 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 ICJ at 25, 58.
51 Fox, The LawofState Immnnio at 29-30 (cited in note 1). See also Tomuschat, The International Law
of State Immunity and Its Development by Nalional Inslitutions at 1119-20 (cited in note 22).
52 See Section V.B.1.
53 Carlos M. Vdizquez, Altmann v. Austria and the Retroactitily ofthe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 3 J
Intl Crim Just 207, 213 (2005).
54 Id.
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V. RETROACTIVITY AND LEGALITY
This section argues that viewing foreign sovereign immunity and official
status immunity as doctrines affecting adjudicative, not prescriptive, jurisdiction
reconciles these immunities with legality principles central to the rule of law.55 In
other words, it gives the doctrines what we might think of as rule-of-law
coherence by helping them satisfy certain core criteria that "concern the form of
the norms that are applied to our conduct" 56-criteria that insist, for example,
that law be general, public, prospective, intelligible, consistent, practicable,
stable, and congruent.57 Each of these rule-of-law criteria, to quote Lon Fuller,
helps law achieve its "objective of giving a meaningful direction to human
effort."58 In short, the less law conforms to these rule-of-law criteria, not only is
it less fair, but it is also less effective. Imagine a secret law (failing the criterion of
publicity), or a law written in gibberish (failing the criterion of intelligibility), or a
law commanding people to do the impossible-for example: "From now on
everyone must levitate at all times" (failing the criterion of practicability). Each
of these rule-of-law deficiencies undermines both the legitimacy and the efficacy
of the law in question.
Viewing foreign sovereign and status-based immunities as adjudicative
jurisdiction doctrines helps the doctrines conform to the rule of law by avoiding
the opposite of prospective laws: retroactive laws. The longstanding principle of
non-retroactivity of the law, also commonly referred to in the criminal context
as legality, holds that for a legal prohibition to be applied to conduct the
prohibition must have governed the conduct when and where it occurred. 9
Otherwise, application of the legal prohibition could be unfair because those
engaging in the conduct may not have had adequate notice of the law regulating
their conduct when and where they acted.6" Legality also safeguards the
legitimacy and efficacy of the law itself; if actors cannot predict how the law will
55 See Anthony J. Colangelo, SpaalLegalioy, 107 Nw U L Rev 69, 71-72 (2012).
56 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in James E. Fleming, ed, Getting to
the Rule of Law 4 (New York 2011).
57 Id at 4-5.
58 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 66 (Yale 1964).
59 Colangelo, Spatial Legaliy at 71-73 (cited in note 55).
60 See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legaliy, 154 U Pa L Rev 335,
336 (2005) (noting that "[i]n its original Latin dress, the legality principle was expressed as 'nullum
crimen sine lege, nullapoena sine lege,' meaning roughly 'no crime without law, nor punishment without
law"').
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end up treating their behavior, the law loses legitimacy and effectiveness as a
tool for shaping behavior.6
If all foreign sovereign and official status immunities do is affect the
adjudicative jurisdiction of courts, two important consequences follow. First, the
relevant conduct or event to which the immunities apply is not the conduct
underlying or giving rise to suit, but rather the court's exercise of jurisdiction to
entertain that suit. As a result, the applicable law-in-time to gauge immunity
claims is the law in existence at the time a court decides whether to entertain
suit, not the law in existence at the time of the conduct underlying the suit. This
is an important consequence because, like all international law, the law of foreign
sovereign and official status immunities is fluid; it can and has changed over
time and it is likely to continue to change. Thus, claims that may not have
succeeded in the past because they would have run into an immunity blockade
may now move forward on the same underlying facts, and vice versa.62
The second important consequence is that situations in which these
immunities previously would have blocked proceedings that later may go
forward due to a post-conduct rescission of immunity-think a waiver of
immunity or a lapse in official status-present no retroactivity or legality
problems. As long as a basis of prescriptive jurisdiction existed at the time of the
conduct underlying the suit, the substantive law sought to be applied in the later
proceedings governed the conduct when and where it occurred. In this way,
viewing the immunity as an adjudicative jurisdiction doctrine gives it rule-of-law
coherence.
Perhaps this second point is more effectively made in the converse.
Suppose foreign sovereign and official status immunities were incorrectly viewed
as affecting prescriptive jurisdiction. They would then block the jurisdiction of
foreign states to regulate the conduct underlying specific claims instead of
merely blocking the jurisdiction of foreign states' courts to entertain those
claims. Accordingly, any time a post-conduct trigger like a lapse in official status
or a waiver were to rescind the immunity, any proceedings dependent on that
post-conduct trigger would entail retroactive application of the law (since the law
being applied did not, as a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction, govern the conduct
when and where it occurred). And because international and US law have long
61 John Calvin Jeffries Jr., Legalfit, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va L Rev 189, 205
(1985) (stating that "[n]otice is essential to fairness. Crimes must be defined in advance so that
individuals have fair warning of what is forbidden: lack of notice poses a 'trap for innocent' and
'violates the first essential of due process of law."') (citation omitted). See Landgraf v USI Film
Prods, 511 US 244, 266-67 (1994); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem Corp v Bonjorno, 494 US 827, 855-56
(1990) (Scalia concurring). See also Dash v Van Kleeck, 7 Johns 477, 485 (NY Sup Ct Feb 1811).
62 See Section V.A.
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contemplated post-conduct rescissions of immunity,63 the result would be an
incoherent doctrine, at least in terms of the rule-of-law criterion of legality. I will
elaborate each of these two consequences in turn.
A. Retroactivity and the Applicable Law in Time
In line with the adjudicative jurisdiction view of foreign sovereign and
status-based immunities, both international and US courts consider the relevant
conduct to which these immunities apply to be the exercise of jurisdiction by
courts to entertain suit, not the conduct underlying or giving rise to that suit. As
a result, if the law of immunity changes in a way that removes (or adds)
immunity where it did not previously exist at the time of the underlying conduct,
courts use the current law of immunity when deciding whether to exercise
jurisdiction. Consequently, the actionability of claims arising out of the same
underlying conduct changes right along with changes in the law of immunity.
For example, in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case the ICJ viewed
immunity as a procedural doctrine that governs only the competence to
adjudicate a dispute, not the lawfulness of the conduct underlying that dispute.64
In turn, the ICJ applied the contemporary law of foreign sovereign immunity to
proceedings concerning underlying conduct and events from 1943-45. 6' Again,
to make the point conversely: if foreign sovereign immunity were instead a
doctrine of prescriptive jurisdiction, it would have governed the lawfulness of
the conduct itself. And if that were so, then the Court would have had to apply
the law of immunity at the time the conduct occurred in 1943-45 or nisk serious
legality or retroactivity problems because applying the contemporary law of
immunity in 2012 would have resulted in retroactive application of current rules
to conduct in 1943-45. But because the relevant question was not the lawfulness
of the underlying conduct but rather the jurisdiction of a foreign court to
adjudicate disputes arising out of that conduct, the contemporary law of
immunity could apply without amounting to retroactive application of the law.
66
This approach also fits with the US Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
applicability of the FSIA to post-enactment claims predicated on pre-enactment
conduct. The leading case in this area, Republic of Austria v Altmann,7 could easily
inspire a movie script and dramatically shows how intervening changes in the
63 See Section V.B.
64 Jurisdictional Immunities ofthe State, 2012 ICJ at 25, 1 58 (cited in note 26).
65 While substantive rules generally are not applied retroactively, procedural rules generally can be.
See Landgrafv USI Film Prods, 511 US 244, 275 (1994).
6 JurisdictionalImmunities ofthe State, 2012 ICJ at 38, 93 (cited in note 26).
67 541 US 677, 680 (2004).
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law of foreign sovereign immunity may open up new avenues of relief. Maria
Altmann, the sole surviving heir of Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, a Jewish Viennese
sugar magnate and patron of the arts, sued Austria and the Austrian National
Gallery in US court to recover a number of paintings by the famous Austrian
artist, Gustav Klimt. 8 The paintings, two of which were of Ferdinand's wife
(with whom Klimt is alleged to have had an affair69), were Ferdinand's before
the Nazi invasion and annex of Austria, or what became known as the
"Anschluss."7 ° Ferdinand fled Austria before the invasion, during which his
sugar company was "Aryanized" and his home and possessions, including the
paintings, taken by the Nazis.7 Through a number of transactions including
sales by one "Dr. Fuhrer"-the Nazi lawyer who initially took possession of the
Klimts-the paintings ended up in the Austrian National Gallery.72 After an
investigative journalist uncovered evidence pointing to Altmann's rightful claim
to the paintings decades later, and efforts to recover them through the Austrian
justice system proved difficult, Altmann sued in the US District Court for the
Central District of California to get the paintings back.73
Altmann argued that Austria and the Gallery were not entitled to foreign
sovereign immunity under the FSIA because her claims fell within the Act's
express "expropriation exception," which exempts from immunity cases
involving "rights in property taken in violation of international law., 74 In
response, Austria and the Gallery argued that in the late 1940s when most of the
alleged wrongdoing took place, they would have enjoyed absolute immunity;
accordingly, their argument went, to apply the 1976 FSTA to such pre-enactment
conduct would constitute an impermissible retroactive application of the law.75 It
should be said that the Court's discussion of the retroactivity issue thus framed
is not a model of clarity. But it does conform to the general notion that
immunity is jurisdictional in the sense that it blocks the adjudicative jurisdiction
of courts as opposed to prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate conduct.
The Court began by observing that statutes that "merely confer or oust
jurisdiction" could be applied to past conduct because "[s]uch application...
usually takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to
68 Id.
69 See Frank Whitford, Klimt 12 (Thames & Hudson 1990).
70 Altmann, 541 US at 682.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id at 684-85.
74 Altmann, 541 US at 685 (quoting 28 USC 5 160 5(a)(3)).
75 Id at 686. This argument was made as a matter of statutory construction. Congress could have
applied the law retroactively with a clear statement, but did not.
Summer 2013
Chicago Journal of International L-aw
hear the case. ' 16 In this connection, the Court explained that "the FSIA merely
opens United States courts to plaintiffs with pre-existing claims against foreign
states; the Act neither increases those states' liability for past conduct nor
imposes new duties with respect to transactions already completed. 7 This is
consistent with viewing foreign sovereign immunity as a doctrine of adjudicative
jurisdiction. Because the relevant conduct at issue is the court's exercise of
jurisdiction to entertain the claim, not the conduct underlying the claim, there is
no retroactivity problem.
Nonetheless, the Court found its observation about the FSIA's
jurisdictional nature to be in "tension" with prior precedent describing the FSIA
as a codification of "the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an
aspect of substantive federal law. ' 78 As a result, the Court was unable to cleanly
categorize the statute as either purely procedural or purely substantive. This left
the Court searching for anything else in the statute or its enactment history that
would suggest whether, and how, it should apply.
Here the Court latched onto the preamble, which provides "Claims of
foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter. 79 The Court found this language "unambiguous: Immunity 'claims'-
not actions protected by immunity, but assertions of immunity to suits arising
from those actions-are the relevant conduct regulated by the Act; those claims
are 'henceforth' to be decided by the courts."8 In other words, the relevant
conduct addressed by the statute is the court entertaining the claim, not the
conduct underlying the claim. The Court's analysis thus wound its way around
the precedent calling the Act substantive and, in this roundabout way, concluded
that foreign sovereign immunity is a doctrine of adjudicative jurisdiction.8'
Altmann's holding has also been used to opposite effect; that is, it has been
used to confer immunity where immunity otherwise would not have existed
when the conduct underlying the suit occurred. In Abrams v Societe Nationale Des
Chemins De Fer Francais, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (on
76 Id at 693 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
77 Id at 695 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
78 Altmann, 541 US at 695 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
79 Id at 697 (quoting 28 USC § 1602).
80 Id.
81 Justice Scalia was much more straightforward in his concurrence, explaining that "the purpose of
provisions conferring or eliminating jurisdiction is to permit or forbid the exercise of judicial
power rather than to regulate primary conduct, so that the relevant time for purposes of
retroactivity analysis is not when the underlying conduct occurred, but when judicial power was
invoked." Id at 703 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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remand to reconsider in light of Altmann),82 used the present status of the French
national railroad company to immunize it against claims for war crimes and
crimes against humanity arising out of the transportation of tens of thousands of
civilians to Nazi death and labor camps. 83 Although at the time of the alleged
wrongdoing the railroad was under entirely civilian control, and therefore would
not have enjoyed immunity in US courts, it had since been wholly acquired by
the French government. 4 Relying on Altmann, the Second Circuit held that the
present status of the railroad was the relevant status to determine immunity, and,
"[a]ccordingly, the evil actions of the French national railroad's former private
masters ... are not susceptible to legal redress in federal court today, because
defendant has since become a part of the French government and is therefore
immunized from suit by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.""5
B. Legality and Rule-of-Law Coherence
The second important consequence of viewing foreign sovereign and
status-based immunities as relating to adjudicative jurisdiction is avoidance of
retroactive applications of the law. Both international and US law permit post-
conduct triggers to rescind both types of immunity. Again, to put the point
conversely: if foreign sovereign and status-based immunities were instead viewed
as prescriptive jurisdiction doctrines, any proceedings based on post-conduct
rescissions of immunity would create legality or retroactivity problems because
the substantive conduct-regulating rule sought to be applied in the proceedings
did not govern the underlying conduct when and where it occurred. But because
foreign sovereign and status-based immunities block only the adjudicative
jurisdiction of courts, no legality problems arise since prescriptive jurisdiction to
regulate the underlying conduct existed when the conduct occurred. A few
status-based immunity examples illustrate the point.
1. Waiver.
First, according to both the ICJ and US courts, a defendant's home state
can waive the defendant's status-based immunity before a foreign state's
courts. 86 But if that foreign state could not have prosecuted or entertained suit
82 389 F3d 61, 63 (2d Cir 2004).
83 Id at 62.
84 Id.
85 Id at 64-65.
86 See Fox, The Law of State Immunity at 30-32, 105 (cited in note 1). See also Mamani v BerZain, 654
F3d 1148, 1151 n 4 (11th Cir 2011) (stating that "[wie accept that the present government of
Bolivia has waived any immunity that defendants might otherwise enjoy"); United States P Noiiega,
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before the waiver because it didn't have prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the
conduct when it took place, there is an ex post facto problem. In other words, it
cannot be that the only reason the conduct in question can now be subject to
the foreign state's substantive conduct-regulating rule is an ex post trigger, like a
waiver of immunity. The waiver would effectively spring to life a previously
inapplicable conduct-regulating rule, which then would have to reach back in
time to regulate the conduct at issue. Such an application of the law would be
blatantly retroactive.
Rather, the better way of understanding the interaction between
jurisdiction and status-based immunity is that the foreign state always had
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the conduct when and where it occurred.
The status-based immunity simply blocked foreign states' courts from
entertaining suit against the defendant. But once immunity is waived, that waiver
removes the adjudicative-jurisdiction impediment to foreign court proceedings.
The foreign state may then enforce via judicial process the conduct-regulating
rule that had already governed the conduct when and where it occurred.
2. Change in status.
Similarly, the ICJ has explained that after a person ceases to hold an office
to which immunity attaches, that person will no longer enjoy all the status-based
immunities accorded by international law in foreign states.8" Again, the only way
an ex post event, such as a change in status-say, from Head of State to not-
Head of State, or Minister of Foreign affairs to not-Minister of Foreign
Affairs-occurring after conduct takes place can justify the application of a
substantive rule to the conduct is if the rule already applied at the time of
conduct, but just couldn't have been enforced through judicial proceedings
because of the status. On the other hand, if the substantive rule did not apply at
the time of the conduct, there is once again a legality or retroactivity problem:
application of the substantive conduct-regulating rule is predicated on some ex
post trigger, namely the change in official status.
3. Other forums.
Finally, the ICJ has also observed that status-based immunity does not
shield current office holders in proceedings before their home country courts
and international criminal courts with appropriate jurisdiction.88 The availability
of these other forums suggests that where foreign states seek to apply
117 F3d 1206,1212 (11th Cir 1997) (citing In re Doe, 860 F2d 40, 44-46 (2d Cir 1988)); In re Grand
Jug7 Proceedings, Doe No 700, 817 F2d 1108, 1110-11 (4th Cir 1987).
87 Arrest Warrant of 11 Apii12000, 2002 ICJ at 25, T 61 (cited in note 27).
88 Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Offitials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic
Courts, 21 EurJ Intl L 815, 838-39 (2010).
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international substantive norms applicable everywhere, the conduct-regulating
rule of international law regulates the conduct when and where it occurs; other
states just cannot enforce that same substantive rule in their own domestic
courts. But the defendant's home state, and international tribunals, may.
This last point has taken center stage in domestic cases alleging violations
of jus cogens norms of international law against both other states and their
officials. And it has done so mainly by supplying a doctrinal device for
reconciling foreign sovereign and status-based immunities withjus cogens in a way
that preserves immunity in the face of allegations of serious violations of
international law. The Latin term jus cogens, or compelling law, "refers to
[international law] norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom."8 9 While the list may vary depending on the
source one consults, these norms are generally considered to include
prohibitions on serious human rights abuses like genocide, slavery, torture, and
systemic racial discrimination.9 ° If the peremptory power of jus cogens trumps
contrary rules of international law, a question instantly arises whether jus cogens
therefore also trump immunity for perpetrators ofjus cogens violations.91 At least
since Nuremburg, international law has imposed individual liability on
perpetrators of certain serious violations of international substantive law, 92 and
immunity from proceedings designed to actually bring that liability to bear
appears in tension with such an imposition of liability.93
Yet by viewing foreign sovereign and official status immunities as
immunities from adjudicative jurisdiction, courts have been able to disaggregate
the substantive prohibition ofjus cogens on the one hand and its enforcement via
certain types of judicial proceedings on the other, and thereby elide direct
conflict between the two sets of norms. The rationale is basically as follows:
because these immunities are not substantive bars to liability, they don't directly
collide with the jus cogens nature of the substantive proscription of the conduct
under international law. Hence, even accepting a "normative hierarchy" in
international law in whichjus cogens trump all contrary norms,9 4 there is no direct
89 Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduday Theory ofJus Cogens, 34 Yale J Intl L 331, 331
(2009).
90 Id.
91 See, for example, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 ICJ at 37-39, 92-97 (cited in note 26).
This is also often referred to as the "normative hierarchy theory." Akande and Shah, 21 EurJ Intl
L at 832 (cited in note 88); Caplan, 97 AmJ Ind L at 766-67 (cited in note 21).
92 See In re Goering and Others, 13 ILR 203, 221 (Ind Mil Trib 1946). See also Fox, The Law of State
Immuniy at 675-76 (cited in note 1).
93 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000, 2002 ICJ at 11-19, 23-44 (cited in note 27).
94 See Caplan, 97 Am J Intl L at 766-67 (cited in note 21).
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clash betweenjus cogens and immunity, since the conduct may still be unlawful as
demanded by jus cogens, whereas immunity merely regulates or allocates the
exercise of jurisdiction by states' domestic courts to enforce that substantive
prohibition against other states and their officials. As the ICJ put it in the
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case:
The two sets of rules [foreign sovereign or state immunity and jus cogens]
address different matters. The rules of State immunity are procedural in
character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one
State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear
upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the
proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful.95
Similarly, as to official status immunity, the Arrest Warrant judgment explained:
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility
are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional
immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain
offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all
criminal responsibility. 96
Accordingly, as with foreign sovereign or state immunity, substantive
liability exists under international law and status-based immunity just blocks its
enforcement by other states' courts.
VI. CONDUCT-BASED IMMUNITY AND JUS COGENS
Until now I have largely left aside the doctrine introduced earlier of
conduct-based immunity or immunity ratione materiae, which immunizes in one
state's courts official conduct performed by those acting on behalf of other
states.97 Unlike the fairly well settled law of foreign sovereign and status-based
immunities, the law of conduct-based immunity is in flux. This section aims
principally to assess the law of conduct-based immunity and, more specifically,
legal arguments for and against using conduct-based immunity to block foreign
courts from entertaining claims ofjus cogens violations.
The discussion proceeds in two main stages. I first suggest that a promising
and, if not under-argued at least under-scrutinized, avenue of argument for the
jus cogens nature of an alleged international law violation to override conduct-
based immunity is to cast the immunity as a substantive, as opposed to a
procedural or jurisdictional, defense. Promising does not, however, always mean
persuasive. Thus, second, I explore situations in which casting conduct-based
95 JurisdicionalImmunities of the State, 2012 ICJ at 38, 93 (cited in note 26).
96 Arrest Warrant of 1l April 2000, 2002 ICJ at 25, 60 (cited in note 27).
97 See Wuerth, 51 VaJ nd L at 929 (cited in note 13).
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immunity as substantive is most persuasive on the current state of the law. As
will be seen, the law of conduct-based immunity does not always fully cohere
across different types of suits.
One may think it an unfortunate feature of law, and of international law in
particular, that it does not always cohere. Yet the fractures that lead to
incoherence are often what make room for change. In this vein, I suggest that
the present incoherence of the law of conduct-based immunity may signal
developments to come: namely, that in some respects immunity is eroding in the
face of allegations of serious human rights abuses. Accountability for human
rights violations has been pressing on immunity norms for some time. And
while the settled law of foreign sovereign and status-based immunities has
successfully resisted that pressure, the less-settled law of conduct-based
immunity may not.
Here I would also like to try to be as normatively and methodologically
transparent as possible. As it stands, the immunity doctrines that have
crystallized thus far do not make much room for accountability absent a state
either proceeding against its own agents for conduct performed on its behalf or
consenting to other states doing so, unless it is in the empirically exceptional
circumstance that an international tribunal with jurisdiction takes the case. Some
readers may think it is never appropriate for one state to hold another state's
agents accountable under international law absent the latter state's consent. I
would not legally foreclose that possibility. Yet in what circumstances such
proceedings ought to be allowed should, in my view, be up to states. This
Section's objectives are to canvass the law and legal argument relating to
conduct-based immunity and jus cogens, and to assess arguments for making, or
keeping, the possibility of "horizontal" enforcement among states available.98
I should also be clear that because, in my view, there is currently not
enough state practice accompanied by the requisite opinio juris to support a
classification of conduct-based immunity as either substantive or jurisdictional,99
the arguments below that conduct-based immunity can be viewed as substantive
do not purport to describe current international law. Rather, I seek only to
identify an area of legal uncertainty and to outline arguments from which
litigants and other international legal actors may build. To the extent they are
successful, that success may furnish hard data that can substantiate classifying
conduct-based immunity and resolve present uncertainty as to its nature.
98 Chim~ne I. Keitner, Germany v. Italy and the limits of HoriZontal Enforcement: Some Reflections from a
United States Perspective, 11 J ICJ 167 (2013)
99 To constitute evidence of customary international law there must be both state practice and opinio
juis addressing the issue. Compare Wuerth, 106 Am J Intl L at 742-65 (cited in note 5) (carefully
analyzing state practice and opiniojuris with respect to a human rights exception to immunity).
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A. Conduct-Based Immunity as a Substantive Defense
Casting conduct-based immunity as an affirmative substantive defense
offers a way forjus cogens to conflict with, and override, the immunity. Because a
substantive defense of immunity does not block the jurisdiction of foreign
courts to entertain suit, but instead blocks application of the otherwise
applicable law to the defendant's conduct, viewing conduct-based immunity as
substantive undermines prevailing arguments that preserve jurisdictional
immunity in the face of allegations of serious violations of international law.
More specifically, suits involving accountability for violations of jus cogens pose
more direct conflicts of norms betweenjus cogens and immunity and, in turn, can
create opportunities forjus cogens to trump immunity. Whether one views thejus
cogens trump as an exception to immunity as the US Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit recently did in Yousuf v Samantar,1 ° or as simply precluding the
attachment of immunity to begin with,'' whether and when conduct-based
immunity yields tojus cogens have become major legal questions in both academic
literature and courts around the world.
0 2
Classifying conduct-based immunity as a substantive defense is important
procedurally as well, since it does not affect the jurisdiction of courts as such
and would need to be affirmatively raised, pleaded and proved by defendants, at
least in US courts. 103 The result would be an initial judicial evaluation of the
allegations to determine whether claims have adequate factual and legal support.
As will be seen, US courts already largely perform this type of evaluation under
current pleading standards"° and such an evaluation also matches up with the
US Department of State's approach to determining whether to request immunity
before US courts for former foreign officials accused of serious violations of
international law.
0 5
100 699 F3d 763, 777-78 (4th Cir 2012).
101 See William Dodge, Making Sense of the Fourth Circuit's Decision in Samantar (Opinio Juris
Nov 3, 2012), online at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/11/03/making-sense-of-the-fourth-circuits-
decision-in-samantar/ (visited Mar 1, 2013).
102 See note 18; see also Ulf Underfalk, The Effect ofJus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora's Box,
Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 18 Eur J Intl L 853, 868 (2007).
103 See notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
104 See notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
105 See note 119 and accompanying text.
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B. Implications of Conduct-Based Immunity as a Substantive
Defense
A number of theories have been advanced for the proposition that
immunity does not or should not apply to serious violations of international law
including, in particular, violations ofjus cogens. These theories have been critiqued
by scholars and largely dismissed by courts," 6 mostly on the grounds discussed
above thatjus cogens and immunity address different issues-substantive liability
on the one hand and jurisdiction to entertain suit on the other-and therefore
don't come into direct conflict. But if, unlike foreign sovereign and status-based
immunities, conduct-based immunity is deemed a substantive defense, the
critiques lose force and give way to the possibility of liability for serious
violations of international law colliding with, and overcoming, immunity.
I. The normative hierarchy view.
One argument that immunity should not attach, or is overcome, for serious
violations of international law is the so-called "normative hierarchy" theory
mentioned in the previous Section, which holds that jus cogens trump contrary
norms of international law. °7 As we saw, courts have been able to avoid the
normative hierarchy argument by basically avoiding direct conflict betweenjus
cogens and immunity: that is, by disaggregating the substantive prohibition ofjus
cogens from the amenability to suit in another state's courts, jus cogens and
immunity do not directly conflict." 8 But if conduct-based immunity is
substantive rather than jurisdictional, the foreign court's power to entertain suit
is not called into question. The question, instead, is whether conduct-based
immunity shields the defendant from the operation of the otherwise applicable
substantive law, including the international law imposing liability for serious
human rights abuses. In this respect, conduct-based immunity does come into
conflict withjus cogens and, accordingly, must yield.
106 See notes 95-96. See also Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign CriminalJurisdiction
By Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, UN Intl L Commn, 62d Sess at 38-39 64, UN
Doc A/CN.4/631 (Jun 10, 2010). But see Yousuf, 699 F3d at 778.
07 Caplan, 97 Am J Intl L at 766-67,776 (cited in note 21) (statingthat "immunityin the forum state
does not amount to global impunity for state conduct that violates human rights.., the forum state
may pursue a human rights claim in numerous alternative political and judicial arenas"). See
Siderman de Blake v Republic ofArgentina, 965 F2d 699, 718 (9th Cir 1992) (stating in dicta that "[a]
state's violation of thejus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore would not be entitled
to the immunity afforded by international law").
108 See notes 95-96.
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2. The implied waiver view.
Another theory argues that because jus cogens violations cannot qualify as
official sovereign acts or conduct under international law, as soon as states
engage in such violations they implicitly waive any immunity under international
law as to that conduct.109 And, because states can act only through human
agents, immunity is also waived as to those agents. There are strong glimmerings
of this theory in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Yousufv Samantar."0 There, the
court refused to accord the defendant conduct-based immunity for serious
human rights abuses and explained that it was following a trend in in which US
courts have "conclud[ed] thatjus cogens violations are not legitimate official acts
and therefore do not merit foreign official immunity.""'
Yet the waiver view has also come under attack, on a couple of grounds.
First, to the extent it purports to say that the jus cogens proscription or criminal
nature of the conduct under international law strips that conduct of its sovereign
or official-function status, the view ignores reality and international laws of
criminal and state responsibility-which impose liability precisely because the
conduct is considered official state action."2 While this critique makes sense, if
accepted it merely restates the basic question whether states and their agents can
be held liable in other states' courts for official conduct that contravenes
international law.
The second and probably more apposite critique for the present analysis is
that by conditioning the existence of immunity on the merits of the underlying
claim, the waiver theory effectively deprives defendants of jurisdictional
immunity by predicating their immunity from suit on an inquiry into the merits
of whether the alleged conduct violated jus cogens."3 But if conduct-based
immunity is deemed substantive and not jurisdictional, this argument also loses
force. The reasoning would be as follows: if immunity is purely jurisdictional, all
a court needs to conclude at the outset of suit is that immunity strips it of power
over the defendant and the case is dismissed. But if immunity is deemed an
affirmative substantive defense, the factual allegations in the complaint get
squarely before the court, at least in the United States.' The defendant then
bears the burden to raise and plead the affirmative defense in response,' and in
109 See Akande and Shah, 21 EurJ Intl L at 815, 827-30 (cited in note 88).
H0 699 F3d at 777.
M Id at 776.
112 Akande and Shah, 21 EurJ Intl L at 830-32 (cited in note 88).
113 Id.
"4 GomeZ v Toledo, 446 US 635, 640-41 (1980).
115 Id.
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turn there is procedural room for an initial evaluation of the legal and factual
merits of the claim. It is at this stage that courts may determine whether the
claims are well substantiated enough to legally and factually make out ajus cogens
violation that defeats conduct-based immunity.
In fact, US courts already engage in just this type of analysis under current
pleading standards, which instruct courts to evaluate allegations for "plausible
grounds" that a violation occurred.1 6 This is a fact-intensive exercise that
requires courts to first identify "legal conclusions" and strip them from the
complaint, and to then evaluate whether the remaining factual allegations
plausibly state a claim."' Under this plausibility test, "the well-pleaded facts
[must] permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct."" 8 This evaluation also happens to correspond with the US State
Department's indications of when it will request conduct-based immunity on
behalf of foreign defendants in US courts-namely, when "the complaint
contains largely unspecific and conclusory allegations."" 9 In sum, treating
conduct-based immunity as an affirmative substantive defense carves out room
under existing procedural mechanisms for courts to initially evaluate whether
claims of jus cogens violations are plausibly supported in fact and law without
damaging the notion of jurisdictional immunity. And these procedural
mechanisms furnish an inquiry that matches up nicely with the US State
Department's standard for deciding whether to request conduct-based
immunity.
A final point in support of this type of initial judicial evaluation is that even
jurisdictional immunities do not absolutely bar all judicial inquiry into the
substance of claims. For example, courts have long distinguished at the outset of
suits between acts jure imperii, or public acts of the state that entitle it to
immunity, and acts jure gestionis, or private commercial acts of the state that do
not.2 ° If any judicial inquiry into the nature of claims necessarily defeated
immunity, this longstanding and widely accepted distinction could not have
developed and would need to be abandoned. Thus not only do courts already
116 BelAt/Corp v Twomb/y, 550 US 544, 556-57 (2007).
117 Ashcroftvlqbal, 556 US 662, 678-79 (2009).
118 Idat 679.
119 Letter of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor to US Dept of State, to The Honorable Stuart F.
Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Arty Gen, Civil Div, Dept of Just, Dec 17, 2012, Re: Scherr v
Lashkar-e-Taiba et a., No 10-05381-DLI (EDNY); Chroman v Lashkar-e-Taiba et al., No. 10-05448-
DLI (EDNY); Ragsdale v Lashkar-e-Taiba et al, No. 11 -03893-DLI (EDNY); Statement of Interest
and Suggestion of Immunity, Rosenberg et al, v Lashkar-e-Taiba et al, Civ Nos 10-10-05381 -DLI, 10-
05382 DLI, 10-05448-DLI, 11-03893 DLI, *10 (filed Dec 17, 2012).
120 See JurisdictionalImmunities ofthe State, 2012 ICJ at 25, 60 (cited in note 26); Wuerth, 106 Am J
Intl L at 738 (cited in note 5).
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perform some initial factual and legal inquiry to resolve immunity claims-even
when claims are jurisdictional-treating conduct-based immunity as a
substantive defense would open up more procedural space for courts to inquire
into the legal and factual bases of claims alleging violations ofjus cogens for which
individual liability exists under international law.
3. The implied override view.
Another view sees the postwar development of principles authorizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction by states over serious violations of international law
committed by nationals of other states in an official capacity as erasing conduct-
based immunity as to those violations. l In other words, the jurisdictional
principles imply an override of immunity for the offenses for which they created
jurisdiction; accordingly, I call this the implied override view. This was more or
less the rationale employed by some of the Law Lords in the famous Pinochet
case: 122 because the UN Convention Against Torture provides for the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by all states parties over conduct-torture-that by
definition must be committed in an official capacity, the jurisdictional provisions
implicitly overrode any prior rule of immunity that would have rendered those
provisions basically meaningless. 123 Thus, the argument goes, "where extra-
territorial jurisdiction exists in respect of an international crime and the rule
providing for jurisdiction expressly contemplates prosecution of crimes
committed in an official capacity, immunity ratione materiae cannot logically co-
exist with such a conferment of jurisdiction.' '124
One difficulty with this argument is that the principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction on which it rests do not distinguish between immunity ralionepersonae
and immunity ralione materiae or, indeed, even mention immunity at all. Thus the
entire argument must be implied, and the implication becomes somewhat
tortured (no pun intended) since the jurisdictional principles must be construed
to implicitly distinguish between different types of immunity, at least on the
current state of the law. For as noted, it is presently clear that immunity ratione
personae continues to exist so as to negate the operation of the jurisdictional
121 See Akande and Shah, 21 EurJ Intl L at 839-46 (cited in note 88).
122 See Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiagy Magistrate, Exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [2000] 1 AC
147, 289 (HL1999) (UK) (opinion of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers) (stating that "rt]he
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction overrides the principle that one state will not intervene in
the internal affairs of another. It does so because, where international crime is concerned, that
principle cannot prevail .... Once extra-territorial jurisdiction is established, it makes no sense to
exclude from it acts done in an official capacity.").
123 Id.
124 Akande and Shah, 21 EurJ Intl L at 843 (cited in note 88).
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principles as to current office holders.12 In turn, one effectively must draw two
implications: first, one must imply an override of immunity; and next, one must
further imply a limit to that override for immunity ratione personae. This sort of
heaping implication upon implication strains the international lawyer's fidelity to
discerning international law from actual state practice and opiniojuris.
Now, one may counter at this point that conduct-based immunity ratione
materiae is distinguishable from status-based immunity rationepersonae because the
very nature of immunity ratione matetiae necessarily precludes the exercise of
jurisdiction contemplated by the extraterritorial jurisdiction principles, whereas
immunity ratione personae reserves at least some role for the jurisdictional
principles once the defendant leaves office. That is, unlike immunity ratione
materiae immunity ratione personae does not completely gut the jurisdictional
principles since they potentially have some bite once the protected status ends
(that is, the accused leaves office). Of course, the jurisdictional provisions also
contemplate extradition, so they may not be completely gutted anyway, 26 and
realistically speaking, immunity ralione personae too may create immunity forever
since potential defendants may grant themselves life tenure in office. But on a
conceptual and doctrinal level, I believe this line of reasoning keys into why
immunity ralione materiae can be treated differently than immunity raione personae:
namely, immunity ratione materiae can resemble a substantive defense to the
application of all other states' laws imposing liability for serious violations of
international law.
C. Application
As noted at the beginning of this Section, unlike the law of foreign
sovereign and status-based immunities, the nature and scope of conduct-based
immunity or immunity ralione materiae remains vague under international law.
While there are some data points, it is probably safe to say that contemporary
state practice and opinio juris have not combined to definitively determine its
scope and, for present purposes, whether it is jurisdictional or substantive in
nature. For their part, scholars tend to categorize it as a substantive defense. For
instance, Antonio Cassese described conduct-based immunity ratione materiae as
"relat[ing] to substantive law," and as a "substantive defence" available to "any
dejure or defacto state agent," when the "violation is not legally imputable to [the
agent] but to his state. 1 2 The late great international lawyer was not alone. 128
125 See notes 14-15.
126 I am indebted to my colleague, Jenia Turner, for pointing this out.
127 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 303-04 (Oxford 2d ed 2008).
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According to Rosanne van Alebeek, "functional immunity constitutes an
exemption from the law in a personal capacity. The term 'immunity' may in fact
not be the most apposite to describe the phenomenon at hand" since the
doctrine instead constitutes a substantive defense.
29
Nonetheless there are reasons to categorize conduct-based immunity as
jurisdictional. One is simple analogy: like foreign sovereign and status-based
immunities, conduct-based immunity functions to shield the state. Because
foreign sovereign and status-based immunities are treated as jurisdictional
shields, conduct-based immunity also should be treated as a jurisdictional shield.
To put a finer point on the analogy: foreign sovereign immunity protects the
state by shielding it from suits in other states' courts; similarly, status-based
immunity shields the state by shielding certain officials currently acting as the
state's key representatives in international relations from suit in other states'
courts. By analogical extension, conduct-based immunity thus also should
protect the state by shielding its agents and former officials from suit in other
states' courts. And, here one can make the analogy even more specific: like
status-based immunity, conduct-based immunity acknowledges that "the state"
is really just an anthropomorphic construct and must, in reality, act through
human agents. Therefore, like status-based immunity, conduct-based immunity
also should protect those agents from suit in other states' courts-whether they
are high-level officials or not, and whether they are current office holders or not.
Yet importantly, this argument is by analogy. That is, it argues that because
conduct-based immunity is like status-based immunity-since it too seeks to
protect the state by protecting the state's agents-conduct-based immunity
ought therefore to be treated like status-based immunity in terms of the nature
and scope of the protection it affords. But this does not necessarily need to be
the case. International law is not analogically generated like, say, the common
law."3 Rather, it is a matter of empirical fact that "results from a general and
128 Akande, 98 Am J Intl L at 413 (cited in note 7) (stating that "this type of immunity [ratione
materiaej constitutes a substantive defense in that it indicates that the individual official is not to
be held legally responsible for acts that, in effect, are those of the state') (citation omitted); Anna
Hood and Monique Cormier, Prosecuting International Crimes in Australia: the Case of the Sri Lankan
President, 13 Melbourne J Intl Law 235, 255 (2012) ("This type of immunity provides a substantive
defence to any criminal charges, in the sense that immunity ratione materiae prevents legal
responsibility from attaching to the individual, and instead shifts it to the state itself.') (citation
omitted).
129 Van Alebeek, The Immuni7 of States and Their Officials at 133 (cited in note 5) (emphasis omitted).
130 See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liabiliy in Human Rights Jligation, 50
Harv Intl L J 271,274 (2009) (explaining that "arguments by analogy are, however, misconceived
to the extent they seek to identify existing customary international law')(emphasis omitted).
Compare Samantarv Yousuf, 130 S Ct 2278, 2289 ("Reading the FSIA as a whole, there is nothing
to suggest we should read 'foreign state' in § 1603(a) to include an official acting on behalf of the
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consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."'31 Accordingly, "[t]hat nations accept a principle.., in one factual
setting does not show that they accept similar principles in distinct factual
settings where the balance of practical and normative considerations may be
different."'' 3 2 And, when it comes to conduct-based as opposed to status-based
immunity, the balance of practical and normative considerations may well be
different.
For sure, at bottom both immunities protect the smooth functioning of
international relations. Status-based immunity does so in an immediate and
concrete way by preventing one state from entertaining suit against another
state's current high-ranking officials formally representing the state in its
international dealings. Conduct-based immunity also serves this international
relations purpose'33 by providing a species of derivative protection for foreign
states.134 That is, it seeks to prevent derivatively entertaining suit against foreign
states by 'piercing the veil,' so to speak, of their sovereign immunity in order to
go after human beings or non-state entities acting on behalf of that state. Yet
conduct-based immunity's derivative protection can be viewed as weaker than
status-based immunity for a number of reasons.
First, the status of the agent protected by conduct-based immunity is
neither synonymous with the state nor integral to conducting international
relations. If the agent were equivalent to the state or so integral to international
relations, he, she, or it would be subsumed under status-based immunity. And
there would, in turn, be no need for different types of immunity. But
international law distinguishes some state agents from others with different types
of immunity; and, those most important to the smooth functioning of
international relations, like heads of state and foreign ministers, enjoy status-
based immunity while in office.
Which leads to a second distinction: the time period of conduct-based
immunity may engender different factual and normative considerations about
the scope of the immunity. Status-based immunity protects high-ranking officials
only while they are in office. The reason for this time period is obvious: if a state
cannot interact with other states through its formal representatives for fear that
foreign state, and much to indicate that this meaning was not what Congress enacted.") (footnote
omitted).
131 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987).
132 Ramsey, 50 Harv J Intl L at 274 (cited in note 130).
133 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immuniy and Domestic Officer Suits, 13
Green Bag 2d 137, 141-45 (2010).
134 See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Offidal Immunioy after Samantar: A United States Government
Perpective, 44 Vand J Transnatl L 1141, 1148 (2011).
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those representatives will find themselves subject to suit in some foreign court in
the course of their official duties, the state cannot act, and international relations
suffers. Once the officials have left office, however, the threat to international
relations is less direct, and status-based immunity ceases. Of course, one could
argue that the possibiliy of being subject to suit at some future point could chill
or deter current officials from performing official duties while in office, and that
may be so. But the point remains that while in office, officials integral to
international relations are totally immune and can perform their functions
without interference. After they have left office, they must rely on a different
immunity.
So far, I think we can say conduct-based immunity is distinguishable from
status-based immunity. But is it weaker? Here international law in the form of
state practice and opinio juris can be helpful. To begin with, it can't be that
conduct-based immunity always protects state agents and former officials from
suit in other states' courts. For that would "contradict[] the established State
practice which holds functional immunity of military officers and other State
officials, whether serving or retired, to be lost in respect of the commission of
international crimes."13 At least since Nuremberg, international law has held
that conduct-based immunity does not protect state agents and former officials
from suit for serious offenses against international law. 3 6 And it won't do to try
to distinguish Nuremberg as an international court, since the tribunal itself was
unambiguous that the states that "created this Tribunal ... have done together
what any one of them might have done singly."' 37 Thus the challenge is to figure
out when-under what circumstances-conduct-based immunity yields to
permit suits for serious violations of international law.
1. Criminal cases.
Nuremberg, along with Spain's well-known initiation of proceedings
against former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet and the decision of the
British Law Lords that Pinochet was not immune from suit for torture,1"' supply
data points in favor of deeming conduct-based immunity either as inapplicable,
or to yield, to norms of liability for serious human rights abuses in criminal
cases. As Curtis Bradley and Laurence Helfer explain, "in the decade following
Pinochet, courts and prosecutors across Europe and elsewhere have commenced
criminal proceedings against former officials of other nations for torture and
135 Fox, The Law of State Immunit at 680 (cited in note 1).
136 See note 137.
137 Judgment, 1 Trial Of The Major War Criminals Before The International Military Tribunal 171, 218
(1947).
138 Bradley and Helfer, 2010 Sup Ct Rev at 238-39 (cited in note 18).
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other violations of jus cogens.' ', 39 Again, a helpful way to conceptualize the
interaction of these doctrines with current rules of foreign sovereign and official-
status immunities would he that conduct-based immunity takes on a substantive
nature in these types of cases. Thus liability for serious human rights abuses
collides with and overcomes immunity, at least in criminal prosecutions. Put
differently, international law has developed such that conduct-based immunity
does not shield perpetrators of serious human rights abuses from criminal
liability in other states' courts if those other states apply substantive international
law. 14'
Admittedly, dicta in the ICJ's opinion in the Arrest Warrant case cut against
this view. In passing on when immunity will not offer protection in foreign
courts, the ICJ stated that one state's courts may try another state's former
official "in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of
office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a
private capacity." '141 This language implies that the only way around conduct-
based immunity for former officials in respect of acts while in office would be if
the acts were private in nature. For reasons already mentioned, creative
categorization of what are really official acts as something else is problematic
and tends to contradict other areas of international law, including the
international law of immunity."' In this case, categorizing official acts that
violate jus cogens as private would muddy the widely held distinction between
public acts Jure imperii, which entitle states to immunity, and private acts jure
gestionis, which do not. Yet the dicta are curious and, as some have noted,
"difficult to justify" in light of established state practice holding, for example,
that no immunity attaches for military and other officials liable for international
crimes. 4 1 Likely the best way around the dicta is that they are just that, dicta, and
in any case should not be read as exhaustive so as to implicitly exclude
development of state practice holding conduct-based immunity inapplicable to
jus cogens violations for which individual liability exists under international law.
Another argument against viewing conduct-based immunity as substantive
might try to make use of the legality principles outlined in the prior Sections of
this Article. The argument would go something like this: if conduct-based
immunity is substantive, then a post-conduct rescission of immunity-like a
139 Id at 239.
140 As with exercises of universal jurisdiction, see note 41, I would insist that the override of
immunity hinge on the faithful and accurate application of substantive international conduct-
regulating law.
141 Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000, 2002 ICJ at 25, 61 (cited in note 27).
142 See Section V.B.2.
143 Fox, The Law of State Immuniz at 680 (cited in note 1).
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waiver of immunity by a defendant's home state--could amount to a retroactive
application of the law. But this argument does not hold up. It would hold only if
conduct-based immunity were already established as a substantive bar to liability
before other states' courts when the defendant acted. Yet that is the very
question at issue. Put another way, imposing liability can only run afoul of
legality if it were already established at the time of conduct that conduct-based
immunity precluded liability. But because state practice and opiniojuris have not
yet combined to establish such a rule, classifying conduct-based immunity as
substantive does not present legality problems. In short, if the law doesn't
immunize defendants, defendants can't claim surprise that the law doesn't
immunize them. In sum, as things stand there is conceptual and doctrinal room
to classify conduct-based immunity as a substantive defense, thereby causing it
to yield to charges of jus cogens violations in criminal prosecutions by foreign
states.
2. Civil cases.
Although conduct-based immunity has given way to liability for jus cogens
violations in criminal cases, "there has been less erosion to date of foreign
official immunity in the civil context.'" I have been skeptical of claims that
there is, without more, something inherently different about the civil versus
criminal context when it comes to the exercise of jurisdiction under international
law.14 Yet where state practice itself evinces a distinction between the civil
versus criminal context, such arguments gain traction. Here state practice does
appear to treat cases somewhat differently based on the type of suit.
The most prominent examples are probably the House of Lords opinions
in Jones v Saudi Arabia.146 The Law Lords relied explicitly on the disaggregation
view of substantive versus jurisdictional rules to uphold immunity, viewing
conduct-based immunity for state agents as largely equivalent to foreign
sovereign immunity, which the Law Lords in turn accepted as "a procedural rule
going to the jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to substantive law; it
does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely
diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement., 147 Moreover, the
Law Lords found the Pinochet ruling inapposite because it dealt with a criminal
144 Bradley and Heifer, 2010 S Ct Rev at 240 (cited in note 18).
145 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The ATS and Extratertitorialiy, Part II: Universal CivilJurisdiction and Choice
of Law, (Opinio Juris Mar 27, 2012), online at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/27/universal-civil-
jurisdiction-and-choice-of-law/ (visited Apr 3, 2013).
146 129 ILR 629, 713 (iIL 2006) (UK).
147 Id at 727, 1 24 (Lord Bingham); id at 732, 44 (Lord Hoffman) (both quoting Hazel Fox, The
Law of State Immuniy 525 (Oxford 1st ed 2004)).
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prosecution as opposed to a civil case. Specifically, the Torture Convention
argument that had been so central in Pinochet was deemed inapplicable to civil
cases, and the UN Immunity Convention of 2004, which, though not in force,
consciously "provides no exception from immunity where civil claims are made
based on acts of torture" gained salience.148 Jones, the UN Convention, and the
fact that, as Bradley and Heifer's study notes, "a number of other jurisdictions
have rejected ajus cogens exception to foreign official immunity in civil cases, '
tilt the current state of the law in favor of conduct-based immunity enduring for
civil cases.
Incidentally, the United States appears to have bucked this trend
somewhat. In particular, modern Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases starting with the
landmark case Ficiriga v Peiia-Iralal'5 show US courts are willing to impose civil
liability on foreign former state agents and officials. Yet many of these cases,
including Fildrtfiga itself-which involved claims against a former Paraguayan
police inspector general"'-cannot be said to squarely raise the immunity issue
since either the foreign government never invoked immunity or waived it.'5 2 As
Ingrid Wuerth has astutely observed, "[a] key step in understanding the
customary international law of functional immunity today.., lies in determining
whether national court litigation in which immunity is not invoked or discussed
nonetheless constitutes state practice or evidence of opiniojuiris.' 53 Because, as
Wuerth explains, forum states apparently have no obligation to confer immunity
when it isn't invoked by a defendant's home state, there are good "reasons why
these cases arguably do not demonstrate acquiescence in the erosion of
functional immunity: the state entitled to raise immunity may not know about
the case; it may successfully elect to contest jurisdiction rather than immunity; or
it may actually favor (or at least not contest) the prosecution of its own
national.'
154
The Fourth Circuit's most recent Samantar opinion did, however, squarely
address whether conduct-based immunity yields to allegations of jus cogens
violations, even though the defendant, and not his home state, raised the
148 Id at 727, 26 (Lord Bingham); see also id at 733, 737, 46, 57 (Lord Hoffman).
149 Bradley and Heifer, 2010 S Ct Rev at 240-41 (cited in note 18).
150 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
151 Idat 878.
152 Id at 889-90; see also, for example, Mamani v Ber'ain, 654 F3d 1148, 1151 (1 lth Cir 2011) ("The
United States government notified the district court that it had received a diplomatic note from
the current government of Bolivia in which the government of Bolivia formally waived any
immunity that defendants might otherwise enjoy.").
153 Wuerth, 106 AmJ Intl L at 733 (cited in note 5).
154 Id.
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immunity claims.'55 And the court came down firmly on the side of no
immunity."' Yet both the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and its decision may prove
vulnerable. As to the court's reasoning, and as noted above, the court relied
intermittently on the implied waiver view thatjus cogens violations cannot qualify
as official conductl'T-a view that has been strongly critiqued and that stands in
tension with other, more settled areas of international law.'58 As to the decision
itself, it may have limited precedential value since it can be preserved but
distinguished from factually different cases in which recognized foreign
governments formally request immunity. While not part of the court's ralio
decidendi, the court noted that it additionally gave "substantial weight" to the
rather unique circumstance-partially motivating the State Department's
suggestion of no immunity-that "Samantar [the defendant] 'is a former official
of a state [Somalia] with no currently recognized government to request
immunity on his behalf."" 59 Accordingly, although US courts have demonstrated
a willingness to entertain civil suits against former foreign officials and state
agents, the cases may not be very strong indicators of state practice and opinio
juris either because foreign governments did not know of or challenge the
immunity, or did not exist at the time of suit.
Perhaps the most promising feature of US law for those who argue against
immunity for allegations of jus cogens violations is the procedural posture in
which immunity is generally raised and treated. Domestic law immunities are
generally viewed as affirmative substantive defenses. As a result, the defendant
must raise and plead the immunity. As the Supreme Court held in Gomez v
Toledo,16 a section 1983 civil rights suit, "[s]ince qualified immunity is a defense,
the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant. ' 16' An interesting question
becomes whether treating immunity as an affirmative substantive defense
extends to international law immunities as well. As a historical matter, the
answer appears to be yes, at least with respect to conduct-based immunities.
Chim~ne Keitner has carefully shown that in early US cases "conduct-based (or
ratione materiae) immunity was treated like an affirmative defense to be pleaded by
155 Yousufv Samantar, 699 F3d 763, 767 (4th Cir 2012).
156 Id at 778.
157 Id at 776 (concluding that "as a matter of international and domestic law, jus cogens violations
are, by definition, acts that are not officially authorized by the Sovereign"); id at 777 (explaining
the trend concluding thatjus cogens violations are not legitimate official acts and therefore do not
merit foreign official immunity).
158 See Section VI.B.2.
159 Yousuf, 699 F3d at 777.
1- 446 US 635 (1980).
161 Id at 640.
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the defendant" and "represent[ed] [a] substantive defense[] to be pleaded on the
merits."' 62 Keitner reveals through an extensive compilation of primary source
materials that conduct-based immunity did not strip courts of jurisdiction in
early US practice but rather embodied an affirmative substantive defense that
was up to defendants to plead and prove.'63
Modern cases are more opaque on the point. In Samantar, for instance, the
Fourth Circuit indicated that foreign sovereign immunity is jurisdictional,
quoting parenthetically a statement from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law that "[t]he immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts
of another state is an undisputed principle of customary international law."'A
The court then distinguished status-based immunity from conduct-based
immunity on the basis that the latter "stands on the foreign official's actions, not
his or her status," though the court also acknowledged that "conduct-based
immunity for a foreign official derives from the immunity of the State." 161 A
focus on the actions alleged, as opposed to the defendant's status, could signal a
more ments-based substantive evaluation, but it also could simply mean that
once it is determined that the acts were official and not private, the conduct-
based immunity "derives from the immunity of the State.""
Yet the most telling aspect of the opinion in this regard was the court's
rejection of conduct-based immunity for violations of jus cogens. The entire
discussion had a very substantive tone, centering principally on the nature of the
acts alleged. The court emphasized, for instance, that "[t]here has been an
increasing trend in international law to abrogate foreign official immunity for
individuals who commit acts, otherwise attributable to the State, that violatejus
cogens norms-that is, they commit international crimes or human rights
violations."'67 Here it was the substantive nature of the acts, as violations ofjus
cogens, which led the court to find no conduct-based immunity. Instead of
invoking the implied waiver view that the acts were not official acts, as the court
had done, the court would have been better off simply saying that the
substantive prohibition on violations of jus cogens collided directly with the
substantive defense of conduct based immunity, and the latter yielded.
162 Chimene I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official lmnunioy, 87 NYU L Rev 704, 757
(2012).
163 See id at 716, 725, 737, 749, 758.
164 Yousuf, 699 F3d 763,773 (4th Cir 2012) (quotingRestatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, part TV, ch 5, subch A, intro note).
165 Id at 774.
166 Id.
167 Idat 776.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Immunities in international law expose multifaceted tensions between goals
of international stability and legal accountability. This Article sought to clarify
the law in this area by giving conceptual and doctrinal coherence to relationships
between immunity and jurisdiction. It explained that foreign sovereign and
status-based immunities are jurisdictional in the sense that they block the
exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by foreign states' courts. The Article also
explained that these immunities do not, however, block the prescriptive
jurisdiction of foreign states' laws to regulate conduct where a basis of
prescriptive jurisdiction exists in international law. And, if the conduct at issue
constitutes a universal jurisdiction offense under international law, all states have
jurisdiction to apply substantive international law proscribing that conduct.
The Article then argued that this view of the relationship between
immunity and jurisdiction makes sense on, and produces two important
consequences for, the current state of the law: first, the relevant law-in-time for
gauging these immunities is the law in existence when a court determines
whether to entertain suit, not the law in existence at the time of the conduct
underlying the suit; and second, this view avoids legality problems or the
retroactive application of the law anytime a post-conduct trigger like a waiver or
change in status removes immunity.
Finally, the Article assessed arguments that conduct-based immunity yields
to claims of jus cogens violations. It explained that deeming conduct-based
immunity a substantive, as opposed to a jurisdictional, defense provides a way
for jus cogens prohibitions to come into direct collision with, and to overcome,
immunity. But the strength of this argument varies with the type of suit. At
present, state practice and opinio juris indicate that customary international law
would receive this type of argument more favorably in criminal prosecutions
than in civil suits.
The most important point of all, however, may be that the law in this area
is in flux. At issue are perhaps the two most salient sets of norms modern
international law knows: state sovereignty and the prohibition on violations of
jus cogens. It is understandable to try to avoid clashes between them-and
international law has largely done so thus far with respect to foreign sovereign
and status-based immunities by classifying them as jurisdictional. Arguments
equating conduct-based immunity to foreign sovereign immunity make
conceptual sense. But they rely too much on analogy and what must at some
level be false equivalences between the various immunities-immunities that
international law itself tells us are different. The sincere international lawyer
cannot so easily set aside actual state practice and opinio juris, which classify
conduct-based immunity differently. On the other hand, arguments in favor of
jus cogens trumping immunity are many. But they have been under attack and
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have largely failed. So something new must be advanced or re-advanced in a way
that can counter the prior rejection of these arguments. In my view, casting
conduct-based immunity as a substantive defense is a promising way to do that.
Going forward, should international lawyers and decision-makers argue that
conduct-based immunity is a substantive defense that collides with, and yields to,prohibitions on jus cogens violations, state practice and opinio juris might
accumulate toward forming customary law in this respect.
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